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Abstract
Whether trade has increased due to the Euro is a question at the
heart of lively policy debates and academic research. We revisit the
question with a new, more powerful econometric test for end-of-sample
breaks to formally identify the timing and duration of the structural
break implied by the “Rose eﬀect” on the Euro Area’s trade. We ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant break in 1999Q1 when using a traditional gravity equa-
tion, corroborating the general consensus in the literature. However,
we ﬁnd that this break is short lived. Furthermore, we show that the
break can be explained both by the marked decrease in real interest
rates across the Euro Area and by deepening European institutional
integration.
Keywords: Gravity equation, International Trade, Common Cur-
rency, Structural break tests in panel data, Euro Area.
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Has the Euro contributed to an increase in trade within Europe? The ques-
tion has attracted particular attention. In policy circles, it directly concerns
countries waiting to access the Euro Area. In academic environments, the
question resonates with a vibrant literature questioning the link between a
common currency and trade. This paper suggests a new methodology to
provide rigorous answers to this questions, hoping to inform policy debates
about the trade-related advantages of adopting the Euro.
This paper contributes to the literature initiated by the pioneering work
of Rose (2000) which concludes that a currency union increases trade by
more than 200%.1 Glick and Rose (2001) later revisit this striking result
using panel data (instead of pooled cross sectional data), to emphasize the
time dimension of trade creation, and conclude that a country can hope
to double its trade by joining a common currency. These results, although
supported by a battery of robustness checks, open three fault lines. First,
the non-random selection of countries adopting a common currency. Second,
the potential reverse causality inciting those prospering from trade to elect
a common currency and third, the fact that the countries in the Rose (2000)
dataset are mostly small, poor, open, remote, island states, whose idiosyn-
chractic characteristics hardly warrant generalizations. Tenreyro (2001) as
well as Tenreyro and Barro (2003) ingeniously solve the problem of endo-
geneity by using countries having coincidentally anchored their exchange
rates to an identical currency. Persson (2001) instead solves the problem of
non-random selection by using matching techniques relevant to the econo-
metric literature on treatment eﬀects. While Tenreyro and Barro (2003)
still ﬁnd a large, positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of a common currency on
trade, Persson (2001) ﬁnds a much diminished one. But subsequent tests in
Rose (2001) on a longer dataset restore the original ﬁndings. In this earlier
literature the diﬃculty lies with the generalization of these results to larger
and more developed economies.
The advent of the Euro has served the literature perfectly. It not only
provides a case study of major developed economies joining their currencies,
but also a natural experiment where many of the methodological criticisms
of Rose (2000) no longer play a prominent role. Rose and van Wincoop
(2001) are the ﬁrst to tackle the question of the Euro, but only insofar as
its potential eﬀects. Their paper provides out of sample predictions based
on transaction costs between European countries relative to other trading
partners (following the theoretical impetus by Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003), suggesting that intra-Euro Area trade should increase by 60% after
the adoption of the Euro.
1For more details on the relevant literature, as well as an illuminating perspective on
its development and novel hypotheses, see Baldwin (2006). In this section, we aim to give
just enough background to set this paper’s approach and results in context.
1As the new currency was actually adopted and trade data started trick-
ling in, several papers competed to be the ﬁrst to explore the so-called “Rose
eﬀect”. The most complete and encompassing in the literature is Micco,
Ordo˜ nez and Stein (2003) [henceforth MOS], and the most methodologi-
cally satisfactory, as per Baldwin (2006), is Flam and Nordstr¨ om (2003).
Both run panel regressions with country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects and dummies for
the Euro. Flam and Nordst¨ om (2003) use unilateral trade data, while MOS
(2003) rely on bilateral averages. Both ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the Euro on trade within Euro Area countries (of the order of 10 to 20%),
as well as a slighter, but still noticeable increase in trade with non-Euro
Area countries.
Other eminent studies which helped pioneer the literature on the Euro’s
trade eﬀects are Barr, Breedon and Miles (2003) [henceforth BBM], which
also considers the eﬀects on FDI, ﬁnancial market development and macro-
economic performance, Bun and Klaassen (2002), which uses dynamic panel
techniques and deNardis and Vicarelli (2003). Each generally corroborates
the results in MOS (2003), although BBM (2003) ﬁnds a trade eﬀect of
nearly 40% in the long run. Piscitelli (2003) warns us that extending the
sample back another decade (to 1980) and the choice of either fob or cif data
could aﬀect the results and possibly lessen the trade eﬀect. Finally, deSousa
(2002) no longer ﬁnds a trade eﬀect when including a time trend, although
such an approach is somewhat ad-hoc and the results do not line up with a
similar investigation in MOS (2003). The only paper to fundamentally shake
the general consensus around the “Rose eﬀect” is Nitsch and Berger (2005).
As Nitsch (2002) had done in the earlier legacy of Rose (2000), Nitsch and
Berger (2005) argues that it is primarily political and institutional integra-
tion among European countries that has increased trade, not the adoption
of a common currency.
Leaving aside the Nitsch and Berger (2005) criticism for the moment,
the ﬁnding of a “Rose eﬀect” following the Euro’s introduction is weak, as
it rests on fairly informal testing techniques, quite appropriate for seminal
works such as those mentioned above, but now surpassed by more powerful
econometric techniques. The authors mentioned above introduce various
ﬂavors of dummy variables to capture the introduction of the Euro. But
asymptotic analysis underlying the F-type tests that some of the authors
employ to test the signiﬁcance of the dummies are not appropriate given the
very few observations after the Euro’s introduction, especially when using
yearly data, and are bound to be inconsistent. Indeed, some authors like
MOS (2003) avoid, in part, the use of explicit tests and rely on eye-balling
the size of the coeﬃcients on the Euro-dummies. A second limitation is that
most papers do not properly account for the non-stationarity of the series
included in the regressions, thus leading to problems of bias in the results.
In this paper, our contribution is twofold. The ﬁrst is methodological.
We construct an end-of-sample structural break test for panel data based
2on the seminal paper of Andrews (2003). This brings formality and ﬂexi-
bility to the seminal tests of the “Rose eﬀect”. The econometric technique
estimates the statistical signiﬁcance of a potential structural break in trade.
Importantly, it also allows the measurement of the duration of a break, even
if short-lasting. The test explicitly addresses the issue of very few observa-
tions following a break, as is the case after the Euro’s introduction. Notably,
it builds a test statistic whose distribution is estimated using parametric
subsampling techniques, and is robust to very few regularity conditions.
The second contribution is to the content of the “Rose eﬀect” literature.
In applying this new test we ﬁnd the following results. As in much of the
relevant literature, we ﬁnd evidence to reject the null of no structural break
in Euro Area trade when using a traditional gravity model derived from
microfoundations. We ﬁnd the break to begin in 1999Q1, corresponding to
the introduction of the Euro. But contrarily to popular speculation that
the increase in trade is only beginning, we ﬁnd that the structural break
is short-lived, lasting for only 10 quarters (2.5 years). Furthermore, we
ﬁnd no evidence of a break in the trade relationship between Euro Area
and non Euro Area EU15 countries nor in trade within this later group,
as opposed to the positive spillover eﬀects on trade found in MOS (2003)
and Flam and Nordstr¨ om (2003). In addition, we test some of the recent
arguments for the causality between a common currency and trade. We
show that the break can be explained by the deepening in European-wide
political and institutional integration, as postulated by Nitsch (2002) and
Nitsch and Berger (2005). Alternatively, we show that the drastic decrease
in real interest rates preceding and following the Euro’s introduction can
also explain the structural break in trade. This is in line with a story of
capital accumulation and ﬁrm entry as presented in Mancini-Griﬀoli (2006).
We begin this paper with an overview of the test for end of sample
structural break in panel data. In section 3, we introduce our microfounded
regression speciﬁcations and review our estimation methodology. Section
4 covers data sources and properties. Section 5 presents and discusses our
results in details. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2 A panel structural break test
2.1 Introduction
We propose and use a panel data adaptation of Andrews’ (2003) new time-
series test aimed at detecting structural breaks at the end of samples. This
new technique oﬀers three main practical and technical advantages which
directly suit our empirical application. First, the test does not make any
distributional assumptions as it estimates empirically the distribution of
the test statistic using an empirical subsampling methodology. Second, the
power of the test stays high even when there is as little as one observation
3after the break date. Third, the test requires very few regularity conditions.
It remains asymptotically valid despite non-normal, heteroskedastic and/or
autocorrelated errors, and non strictly exogenous regressors. Nonetheless it
is important that there be a large number of observations prior to the date
of the suspected break, and that these be stationary and ergodic. By con-
trast, traditional F-type test require normal iid errors and strictly exogenous
regressors.
Andrews (2003) constructs his test statistic based on improvements on
the procedure proposed by Dufour, Ghysels and Hall (1994). The general
intuition is that if there is a structural break, the slope coeﬃcients from the
post-break period will diﬀer from those in the prior-break period. Thus,
errors estimated on post break observations when assuming that the sample
is stable (thus using coeﬃcients estimated over the full sample) would be
large. The test statistic is correspondingly built around these errors, as the
estimated residuals squared divided by the estimated covariance matrix of
the residuals. The appropriate distribution against which to gauge the size
of this statistic is built by estimating equivalent statistics but over the pre-
break sample, then plotting their density function. Asymptotically valid
critical values are then found in a straightforward manner, as the points
below which lie a given percentage of the pre-break statistics. Unfortunately,
the Andrews (2003) testing procedure cannot be used directly in a panel data
context; we therefore propose a practical adaptation of it to suite our work.
2.2 The setting





itβ0 + Uit t = 1     T
X
′
itβ1t + Uit t = T + 1     T + m
(1)
for individuals i = 1     n, and where T is the postulated break date. The
test naturally hinges on the following hypotheses: H0 : β1t = β0 against
HA : β1t  = β0 The coeﬃcients are homogeneous across i under both the
null and the alternative hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis requires all
individuals to exhibit an end-of-sample break.
2.3 The test statistic
Consider the case when there are more observations after the break date
than regressors d, so that (m × n) ≥ d. In words, the test statistic is a
positive deﬁnite quadratic form obtained from the transformed (m×n)×1
vector of residuals by the (m×n)×(m×n) covariance matrix, projected onto
the column space of the (m × n) × d matrix of transformed post-instability
regressors. The panel data equivalent of the generic test statistic in Andrews
4(2003) can be deﬁned after considering an interval τr which spans from
[r r + m − 1] and where r ∈ {1     T + 1}, as:
Sr(β Σ) = Ar(β Σ)
′
V −1
r Ar(β Σ)  (2)












c Wτr = (Yτr − Xτrβ)
where c Wτr is the (m × n) × 1 residual vector of observations starting at r,
with β = b βT+m deﬁned to be the coeﬃcient vector estimated over the full
sample (until T + m). The variance-covariance matrix, b ΣT+m, is given by:









where the (m × n) × 1 residual vector, b Uτr, is:
b Uτr = (Yτr − Xτr b βT+m)
thus a particular form of the c Wτr vector.
This covariance matrix corrects for serially correlated errors, heteresko-
dasticity and potential cross-sectional correlation. These are the elements
found oﬀ the block diagonal of b ΣT+m (the on diagonal elements being the
variances for each individual and the elements in the T × T blocks on diag-
onal being the autocovariances for each individual).
The particular form of the test statistic for the post-break residuals - the
central statistic to the test - is a special form of the generic statistic deﬁned
above. As in Andrews (2003), we call this the S statistic and deﬁne it as:
S = ST+1(b βT+m  b ΣT+m) (6)
Note that when (m × n) ≤ d (there are fewer post-instability observa-
tions than regressors in the model), Andrews (2003) suggests using P =
PT+1(b βT+m  b ΣT+m) where the projection matrix collapses to the identity
matrix Imn.
2.4 Critical values
The critical values are found by empirically generating a distribution func-
tion for the statistic under the null of stability. In practice, we ﬁnd equiva-
lent statistics to S over the pre-break subsample through a rolling window
method spanning m observations (as there are in S). We label these Sr.
When (m × n) ≥ d the T − m + 1 diﬀerent Sr values are deﬁned as:
5Sr = Sr(b β2 (r)  b ΣT+m) (7)
where b β2 (r) is the estimate of β over t = 1     T observations but exclud-
ing r     r + m
2 − 1, or m
2 observations. The reason for excluding these
observations, as given in Andrews (2003) is to optimize both the size and
power of the test in comparison to a b β2 (r) excluding m observations or no
observations at all.
Andrews (2003) shows that the empirical cummulative density function
(CDF) of the Sr values is asymptotically unbiased and consistent. The p-
values are given by:




where 1[ ] is an indicator function.
2.5 Panel-speciﬁc adaptations
The transfer of each step of the Andrews’ (2003) test to panel data is not
immediate. In particular, the variance-covariance matrix b ΣT+m as deﬁned
above will not be invertible in most cases, as it will generally not be of full
rank. The component matrices composed of sub-vectors of residuals, b Uτr b U
′
τr,
are of rank one, as is always the case with outer products. As each of these
b Uτr b U
′
τr matrices are added, the resulting matrix b Στr gains one in rank.2 Such
that the ﬁnal b ΣT+m matrix be of full rank and invertible, there must be at
least as many additions of the b Uτr b U
′
τr matrices than there are dimensions of
b ΣT+m. Thus, the condition for invertibility boils down to T + 1 ≥ (m × n).
Unfortunately, this condition is rarely satisﬁed in a panel setting. Al-
though m is usually small, n can be very large. The product of the two
is usually greater than there are time periods (T + 1) before the presumed
point of instability, unless the pre-break subsample is unusually large. Note
that running the Andrews (2003) test in a time series setting does not en-
gender this complication. In a time series model, b ΣT+m is invertible if and
only if T + 1 ≥ m, a condition that is easily satisﬁed.
Hence, we must impose certain restrictions on the (m × n) × (m × n)
covariance matrix in order to invert it. We redeﬁne a covariance matrix
assuming sectional independence, as is often done in the panel literature,
although continue to allow for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity:








= b ΣT+m (8)
2This comes directly from a well known theorem on rank additivity, stating that for
any two matrices A and B, rank(A + B) = rank(A) + rank(B) if and only if the row








= 0, for i  = j with i j = 1     n, and Ui τr is
an m×1 vector made up of the elements in Uτr corresponding to individual
i.
The resulting covariance matrix ˜ ΣT+m is block diagonal. Each block
corresponds to an individual in our panel, and is thus of dimension (m×m).
Since the inverse of a block diagonal matrix is the inverse of each of its
blocks, the condition for invertibility reduces to that expressed for times
series (namely that T + 1 ≥ m), which we satisfy. In the appendix we
discuss alternative as well as more general conditions for the inversion of
the covariance matrix, possibly useful for other applications of the test.
3 Model speciﬁcations and methodology
3.1 Baseline model
We work with a gravity equation similar to those used in the literature
to date, but with some slight adjustments in conformity with Baldwin’s
(2006) remarks on the mistakes and biases introduced with ad-hoc model
speciﬁcations. In the appendix, we derive our basic gravity equation from
microfoundations. This equation is:
Vi j t = αi j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + ǫi t (9)
where Vi j t is the value of imports from country j to country i, Yj t and Yi t
are nominal GDP, ξi j t is the real exchange rate between the two countries
engaged in trade, and ǫt is a regression error.
Furthermore, αi j is a pair-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect to control for variables of
type common border, language, history, legal system, distance and others
traditionally shown to matter in gravity equations. The advantage of this
“agnostic” approach, as opposed to a fully ﬂeshed out speciﬁcation of each
independent variable, is that we do not run the risk of leaving out a regressor,
or mis-measuring one, as is commonly done with variables such as distance.3
Also, we work with a homogeneous panel, implying constant slope coef-
ﬁcients for all country pairs. This assumption is in line with the Null hy-
pothesis that the relationship between trade and its explanatory variables
has remained stable across Euroland.
Finally, we include in the error term the export country speciﬁc time
trend derived in the appendix. First, doing so makes our results more com-
parable with those in the literature. To the extent that time trends are used
in the literature, they capture more general phenomena like political and
economic integration, factors that we control for explicitly in our model. 4
3Flam and Nordstr¨ om (2003), and MOS (2003) adopt the same approach.
4See, for instance, Cheng and Wall (2005), MOS (2003), Flam and Nordstr¨ om (2003),
Rose and van Wincoop (2001) or Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997).
7Second, since the regressors are all time varying, including time trends could
over-correct for the eﬀect of these on trade and may thus lead to erroneous
coeﬃcient estimates.5 Third, our test for end-of-sample structural break
corrects for the serial correlation introduced in the errors by the time trend.
3.2 Reﬁnements of baseline model
As we will see in the discussion of results, estimating model (9) above clearly
suggests a break in trade among Euro Area countries due to the introduction
of the Euro. But what exactly in the new currency is responsible to boost
trade? Several explanations exist. This paper will test the most promi-
nent and recent ones. The ﬁrst argument suggests that the Euro is besides
the point; its introduction simply coincided with an accelerating process
of European-wide political and institutional reforms favoring trade. Nitsch
(2002) and Nitsch and Berger (2005) are the main proponents of this line of
reasoning. Other arguments pertain more closely to the Euro itself. Bald-
win (2006) suggests that of the variables entering the gravity equation, a
rise in n, the number of exporting ﬁrms in a given country, is likely to be
the key to explain trade creation. More speciﬁcally, Baldwin and Taglioni
(2005) suggest that the disappearance of exchange rate risk induced the
small and medium size ﬁrms formerly unable to protect themselves against
currency ﬂuctuations to enter the export market. Alternatively, Mancini-
Griﬀoli (2006) suggests that it was the decrease in real interest rates, coming
as a pre-condition and consequence of the Euro, that favored the entry of
new ﬁrms and the expansion of existing ﬁrms in the costly export business.
Each of these hypotheses can be evaluated with our panel test for end
of sample structural break, based on modiﬁed versions of our baseline grav-
ity equation (9). Our conjecture is that we will no longer be able to reject
the Null of stability when controlling for the additional explanatory variables
suggested by the above hypotheses if these are valid. To study the argument
advanced by Nitsch and Berger (2005), we add a term, τi t, as justiﬁed in
the appendix, to capture the integration of country i in the European insti-
tutional and political process. To proxy for this variable, we borrow Nitsch
and Berger’s (2005) European Integration Index. The resulting speciﬁcation
is labeled model (B) below.
The story in Mancini-Griﬀoli (2006) is slightly more complex. It is de-
rived from the literature on ﬁrm entry in which ﬁrms must pay a ﬁxed cost
to enter the export business. This cost is determined in terms of capital
and is thus dependent on real interest rates which are set exogenously. As
these decrease, essentially due to the accession criteria accompanying the
Euro, investment in capital rises and more ﬁrms export. The paper derives
model (C) below, where ¯ Ri t = 1 6
P6
s=1 Ri t−s captures average real interest
5This point is also raised in IMF (2004) as one of the main reasons not to use country-
speciﬁc time varying eﬀects.
8rates over 6 quarters, deemed to be the metric most inﬂuential for capital
investment decisions (we alter this speciﬁcations in our robustness checks).
Wages appear as a second factor price, with a lag of four periods in line with
ﬁndings that wages are sticky for approximately one year.
Our regression speciﬁcations are listed below, where, for comparison’s
sake, we label our baseline model (9) as model (A).
(A) Vi j t = αi j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + ǫi t
(B) Vi j t = αi j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + γ4τi t + ǫi t
(C) Vi j t = αi j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + γ5 ¯ Ri t + γ6Wi t−4 + ǫi t
3.3 Estimation methodology: Error Correction Model
Our data analysis will show that all variables in our dataset are integrated
of order one and are cointegrated. In our estimation, we will therefore rely
primarily on models in error correction model (ECM). The ECM entails esti-
mating the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences, while controlling for the cointegrating
relationship. Working with ﬁrst diﬀerenced series allows us to meet the
test’s requirement of stationary and ergodic variables. We build an ECM
model in two stages, as is customary, where the ﬁrst stage estimates the
cointegration vector and the second, the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences while
correcting for cointegration. For model (A), this yields:
Vi j t = αi−j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + ǫi t (10)
∆Vi j t = βb ǫi t−1 + λ1∆Yi t + λ2∆Yj t + λ3∆ξi j t + ui t (11)
where the ﬁrst equation is estimated using diﬀerence from sample mean ﬁxed
eﬀects and the second using pooled OLS.
4 Data
4.1 Description
Most of the literature investigating the eﬀect of a common currency uses an-
nual data, often featuring a small time dimension. We instead use quarterly
data from 1980 Q1 to 2004 Q4, as our estimation method requires a large
time dimension. Our sample is composed of the EU-15 countries, subdivided
into four trading groups: imports of the Euro Area (EA) from Euro Area,
of the Non-Euro Area (NEA) from Non-Euro Area, of the NEA from the
EA and of the EA from the NEA. We exclude Greece from the EA, since it
joined the Euro only in January 2001. As is commonly done, we also group
Luxembourg and Belgium as their trade data are confounded over most of
9our sample period. The main group of interest is the Euro Area. The other
trading groups are used a controls.
The data were obtained from Eurostat, IMF DOTS and IFS, as in most
other relevant empirical papers. A complete table of the data sources is
available in appendix C. We use the Nitsch and Berger (2005) index of euro-
pean integration instead of dummies to track the institutional and political
integration among EU countries emanating from the signing, ratiﬁcation
and implementation of major treaties. We use the unilateral import values
as trade data, obtained from IMF DOTS. Lastly, we adjusted the data for
seasonality when necessary.
Two further points are worth discussing. First, there is a strong ar-
gument in favor of using unilateral instead of bilateral trade ﬂows. Flam
and Nordstr¨ om (2003) follow the same route, also recommended in Baldwin
(2006). At the most basic level, a gravity equation is essentially a demand
equation. Thus, demand in country i ought to be diﬀerent from that in
country j. Also, keeping trade ﬂows separate has the advantage of being
able to pin-point with more precision the eﬀects of a domestic versus a for-
eign explanatory variable. The reverse of the coin is that two observations
of trade will share most of the same regressors.
Secondly, we acknowledge that in principle, working with volumes is
preferable as it allows us to concentrate on changes in the quantity of ex-
ported goods independently of any price movements. Yet, with anything
but ﬁrm level data, working with volumes introduces severe measurement
errors. The problem is particularly acute with aggregate data such as that
used in this paper. First, it is not clear which aggregate price index to use
to transform aggregate imports reported in value into volume. Second, even
if a consistent and accurate import price index existed, it would never be
appropriate to apply to imports from two diﬀerent countries which export
two diﬀerent bundles of goods. Due to these non-negligeable limitations, we
prefer using values. The fact that we control for relative price movements
by including real exchange rates in our regression dampens any potential
distortions due to the use of values instead of volumes of imports.
4.2 Unit root and cointegration results
In table 1, we present our results for the unit root tests applied to Euro Area
data. We apply the Breitung (1997,1999) as well as Im, Pesaran and Shin
(IPS, 2003) procedures. As these results show, we cannot reject the Null of
a unit root with reasonable signiﬁcance for any series, although the evidence
is mixed for interest rates. Because of the various convergence criteria to
enter a monetary union, real interest rates were not entirely stationary over
our sample period, as would otherwise be expected. In particular, there
has been a marked decrease and convergence in interest rates among the
eventual Euro Area countries starting around 1996Q1. [TABLE 1]
10Figure 1 shows how Euro Area average real interest rates (over six quar-
ters) were relatively stable (just below 10%) until about 1996, when a notice-
able downward trend began. In four years, real interest rates lost about 600
basis points, and four years later, after a further 200 basis point decrease,
were at their lowest, at around 2%. [FIGURE 1] Figure 2 corroborates this
ﬁnding by showing how year-on-year growth in average interest rates hov-
ered slightly below zero until about 1996, after which it remained decisively
negative, in the ballpark of −10% or more. The panel test for structural
break requires that the series in the estimation subsample be stationary
and ergodic. In the light of our remarks above, we opt for a conservative
assumption that also interest rates are non-stationary. [FIGURE 2]
Table 2 reports test results for four diﬀerent cointegrating vectors corre-
sponding to the four model speciﬁcation that we investigate in our empirical
section. We adopt the Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests, which have the advantage
of allowing for signiﬁcant heterogeneity between cross-sections. The results
indeed show the presence of cointegration between all series. We view this
as an encouraging ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant long term relationship among our
variables. For simplicity we only report Pedroni’s (1999) ρ and ν-statistics
for the Euro Area group. Similar unit root and cointegration results were
found for the three other control groups (results are available upon request).
[TABLE 2]
5 Empirical Results and Discussion
5.1 Criteria to ﬁnd the break date
We are faced with a tradeoﬀ when deciding what constitutes a structural
break in terms of time span in the post-break period. On the one hand, if
we reject the null of no structural break over a short time span (for example
3 quarters), we may be facing an outlier rather than an actual structural
change in the pattern of the errors. On the other hand, using a long post-
break sample prevents the detection of instabilities if the break is short-lived.
We choose a “break criteria” of 6 quarters as a middle ground. Thus, the
“break date” is deﬁned as the ﬁrst period for which we reject the null of
stability with at least 90% conﬁdence, for a post-break sample of 6 quarters.
The trade literature on the eﬀect of the Euro has debated at length when
the break in trade has occurred. The Euro was introduced in January 1999,
but some argue that expectations of the Euro created a trade eﬀect already
a year earlier. We test the baseline model (A) for various potential break
dates, starting in 1998Q1. According to our “break criteria”, we pinpoint
the break date to be in 1999Q1, thus coinciding with the actual introduction
of the common currency. We do not read more into this result than a mere
coincidence, although the uncertainty around some countries’ likelihood to
11adopt the Euro (like Italy’s) may have played a role in delaying European-
wide trade eﬀects.
5.2 Finding a break in Model A
We ﬁrst concentrate on the Euro Area sample. We test the null of no
structural break on the baseline model (A). As mentioned above, we reject
the Null at the 10% signiﬁcance level for a post-break period of six quarters
starting in 1999 Q1. We subsequently increase the time span by one quarter
at a time and re-test the null hypothesis. Our results are shown in table 3.
We ﬁnd that the probability of rejecting the null is highest (1% level) when
the post-break time period spans from 1999 Q1 to 2000 Q4 (7 quarters).
Evidence of a structural break at the 10% level is found up to the 10th
quarter, or two years and a half (1999 Q1 - 2001 Q3), after the break.
Starting with the 11th quarter, the null of no structural break is not even
weakly rejected. [TABLE 3]
We control our ﬁndings for the Euro Area countries by conducting the
same analysis on trade between non Euro Area EU15 countries, as well as
between non-Euro Area EU15 countries with Euro Area countries in both
directions. Unless there were strong spillover eﬀects on trade, we conjectured
that if we could not reject the Null of stability in any of these trading
relationships, the evidence favoring the trade eﬀect of the Euro would be
strengthened.
Our ﬁndings are summarized in tables 4 − 6. Indeed, we do not reject
the null of stability for trade among non Euro Area countries. Likewise, we
fail to reject the Null for trade emanating from non-Euro Area countries to
Euro Area countries, as well as from Euro Area countries to non-Euro Area
countries. [TABLE 4 -6]
5.3 Explaining the break in trade
When we test model speciﬁcation (B), which includes the European integra-
tion variable, we do not reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level for
time spans of 6 quarters and more, as can be see in table 7. It seems that
our evidence corroborates the Nitsch and Berger (2005) argument, namely
that political and institutional integration in the European Union is a de-
cisive factor in explaining the trade eﬀect of the Euro. The limit of this
explanation is the short time period over which trade increases. Political
integration is a continuous, smooth and still increasing process. It is un-
clear why trade would really only exhibit a break in the late nineties and
subsequent quarters if institutional integration were the sole explanation.
[TABLE 7]
We ﬁnd that model (C) which includes interest rates and wages, can
equally explain the break in trade, as shown in table 8. For any given
12break period, the S statistic decreases far below its equivalent measure under
model (A) with respect to the Sr distribution. The probability of rejecting
the null of stability decreases below the 10% level for all post-break sample
periods. Most notably, for the period where the break is strongest in model
(A), 1999 Q1 - 2000 Q4, controlling for interest rates makes the diﬀerence
between rejecting (at the 1% level) and not rejecting the null hypothesis at
all. If decreasing interest rates are indeed part of the story behind the boom
in Euro Area trade, as these results suggest and according to the theoretical
model in Mancini-Griﬀoli (2006), the rather late break date with respect to
expectations of adopting the Euro may be explained. Since interest rates
started decreasing persistently between 1996 and 1997, it is normal that
eﬀects of capital accumulation would only be felt about two years later,
due to the lag between installing and beneﬁtting from new capital. Indeed,
model (C) includes average interest rates over six quarters to account for
this time to build characteristic. Also, the explanation attached to interest
rates conveniently ﬁts the short time span of the break in trade, as real
interest rates can only realistically decrease (or be expected to decrease) for
a limited time. In fact, ﬁgures 1 and 2 show that there was an important
correction in the downward trend in interest rates starting in 2000Q4 and
lasting approximately 6 quarters. This may have contributed to shortening
or abating the perceived trade eﬀect of the Euro. [TABLE 8]
We conduct several robustness checks to verify whether the marked de-
crease in interest rates can really explain the structural break found in model
(A) for Euro Area data. For these, we use an alternate deﬁnition of average
interest rates. For the tests mentioned above, we had deﬁned ¯ Ri t to include
6 lags. In tables 10 and 11 below, we show that even if it were to include 4
or 2 lags, we still fail to reject the null of no structural break. Thus, alter-
ing the lag structure of the average interest rate does not change our main
ﬁndings. [TABLE 9 - 10]
5.4 Regression results
To build further conﬁdence in our ﬁndings, we present here the estimation
results of the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations analysed in this paper. We use
two estimation methodologies: the ECM as in the testing procedure and a
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) method. The DOLS estimator only focusses on the
long run relationship, but makes appropriate corrections yielding unbiased
coeﬃcients and correct standard errors. Kao and Chiang (1999) show that
the OLS estimator exhibits a non-negligeable bias with ﬁnite samples in
panel cointegrated regression models. As an alternative, Kao and Chiang,
Chen(1999), Kao and Chiang (1998), Phillips and Moon (1999, 2000), as well
as Pedroni (2000), suggest, develop and compare the properties of other esti-
13mators, concentrating on the FMOLS and DOLS procedures.6 Both aim to
correct for two biases, namely the serial correlation and endogeneity created
from the integrated series. The authors generally come to the agreement
that the DOLS estimator out-performs the FMOLS estimator in terms of
non-biaseness. Indeed, in several real-world applications, the DOLS proce-
dure stands out as the most robust.7 The procedure entails estimating the
model with all independent variables in levels, as well as leads and lags of
variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences.8 To illustrate, model (A) in DOLS form gives:







δ2 sYj t+s +
p X
s=−p
δ3 s∆ξi j t+s + ǫt (12)
where we set p = 4 for each of our variables, except in the case of model
(C), where p = 2 for interest rates and wages since both are already lagged.
Our results for the DOLS regressions are illustrated in table 12. The
coeﬃcients and signs on the long run cointegrated variables appear as ex-
pected and match those found in similar studies in the relevant literature.
The coeﬃcient on GDP (both domestic and foreign) is positive and sig-
niﬁcant. That on real exchange rates is negative (a depreciation causes a
decrease in imports), but hardly signiﬁcant (as in MOS, 2003). The coef-
ﬁcient on integration is positive and signiﬁcant, as touted by Nitsch and
Berger (2005). Average interest rates appear as negative and signiﬁcant,
with a rather small magnitidue (indicating a realistic relationship between
interest rates and trade: a decrease of 1% in interest rates increase trade by
0.07-0.1%). It is also encouraging to see that the inclusion of interest rates
does not markedly change the coeﬃcients on GDP, thereby underscoring
that there do not seem to be problems of multicollinearity among our re-
gressors. The only surprise at ﬁrst glance is the magnitude and signiﬁcance
level of wages. But these can be attributed to the high degree of correlation
between wages and trade, both smooth, upward sloping series. [TABLE 11]
Table 13 reports coeﬃcients from the error correction model. The coef-
ﬁcients are as expected in terms of magnitude and sign, mainly as discussed
above. Reassuringly, changes in wages now appear to have realistic mag-
nitude, but are no longer signiﬁcant. This is rather expected as there has
been very little variation in real wages within the EU in the last twenty
6See Baltagi and Kao (2000) for a survey. The DOLS estimator is based on the sin-
gle equation dynamic ordinary least squares method of Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and
Watson (1993).
7See Hafner (2005), Mark and Sul (2003), Kao, Chiang and Chen (1999) for tests of
the PPP hypothesis or the impact of technology diﬀusion on TFP.
8See Mark and Sul (2003) for possibly the clearest explanation for the particular form
of the DOLS regression equation.
14years. More importantly, average interest rate again exhibit a negative sign
and realistic proportions. Note that the t-stats are reported for indicative
purposes only, as they do not feature robust standard errors (due to reasons
discussed above). [TABLE 12]
6 Conclusion
We developed an extension of the end-of-sample structural break test found
in Andrews (2003) to panel data. The panel structure prevents a direct
application of the Andrews (2003) test, and requires an adaptation of the
covariance matrix so that it becomes invertible. This rigorous testing pro-
cedure, built on a distribution estimated with empirical subsampling tech-
niques, is robust to very few post-break observations and allowed us to
formally evaluate the question of Euro’s eﬀect on trade. The test could also
be applied to wide range of other questions tied to the Euro’s introduc-
tion, rousing much speculation but needing more solid statistical grounding.
These include a distinct rise in cross-national business cycle correlations, a
drop in the degree of national price discrimination or an increase in employ-
ment, for instance.
With respect to the question of trade, we corroborate the ﬁndings gener-
ally found in the literature of a break in trade when using a baseline gravity
regression derived from microfoundations. But unlike the earlier literature,
we are able to attribute a precise signiﬁcance level to this ﬁnding. We also
provide new evidence for the timing and duration of the break in trade. We
show that the break starts in 1999Q1, but is short-lived as it spans just
two and a half years (1999Q1 - 2001Q3). Finally, we go one step further in
testing possible explanations for the disproportionate increase in trade. We
ﬁnd evidence for the importance of institutional and political integration
between european countries, as well as the marked decrease in real inter-
est rates preceding and following the introduction of the Euro. We build
conﬁdence for our results by considering three control groups. Indeed, we
ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant break in trade between non Euro-Area (but
EU 15) countries, nor from non-Euro-Area to Euro-Area countries and vice
versa.
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18Table 1: Unit Root tests for the Euro Area series
Breitung test IPS test
intercept int. & slope intercept int. & slope
Stat Prob. Stat Prob. Stat Prob. Stat Prob.
Vi j t -1.05 0.15 1.42 0.92 3.09 1.00 -7.62 0.00
Yi t -0.32 0.37 1.89 0.97 0.76 1.00 0.17 0.57
τj t 1.38 0.92 1.44 0.93 7.17 1.00 4.40 1.00
wi t 0.23 0.59 -0.45 0.33 3.22 1.00 -1.63 0.05
¯ Ri t -1.08 0.13 -2.47 0.006 12.6 1.00 2.87 0.99
Table 2: Pedroni’s (1999) Cointegration Results




Table 3: Baseline Model (A)
Span S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q3 61.8 82 67.4 53.5
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 73.1 72.8 64.4 55
1999Q1 − 2001Q1 50 69.5 61.4 51.6
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 50.2 65.4 56.9 48.9
1999Q1 − 2002Q1 36.9 62.5 50.7 44.7
1999Q1 − 2004Q4 22 87.9 66.4 54.6
Table 4: Trade in Non Euro Area EU15
Break Period S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q3 4.8 27.1 11.2 7.7
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 3.9 27.2 11.3 9.1
1999Q1 − 2001Q1 5.5 27.7 12.3 8.9
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 3.9 28.7 11.5 10.6
1999Q1 − 2004Q4 0.89 19.6 13.1 9.9Table 5: Trade from Non Euro Area EU15 to Euro Area
Break Period S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q3 11.7 57.2 40.2 25.8
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 13.2 56.9 38.5 20.2
1999Q1 − 2001Q1 9.4 61.7 35 24
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 6.6 55.5 32.6 26.4
1999Q1 − 2004Q4 5.6 63.9 35.5 29.1
Table 6: Trade from Euro Area to Non Euro Area EU15
Break Period S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q3 12.1 99.7 37.9 31.8
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 10.4 100 37.8 32.1
1999Q1 − 2001Q1 3.1 99.8 42 33.4
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 2.7 86.8 46 30.2
1999Q1 − 2004Q4 8.1 71.1 61 45.2
Table 7: Baseline with Integration (B)
Break Period S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q3 47.1 135 94.2 74.6
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 53.6 136 96.2 78.4
1999Q1 − 2001Q1 30.3 122 93.8 82.6
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 31.7 124 103 76.2
1999Q1 − 2002Q1 30.4 131 92.7 85.2
1999Q1 − 2004Q4 21.8 142 131 127
Table 8: Augmented Gravity Model (C)
Break Period S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q3 51.9 119 99.2 74.1
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 66.4 105 92.3 81.3
1999Q1 − 2001Q1 45.8 106 92.6 72.3
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 46.6 98.8 89.2 82
1999Q1 − 2002Q1 39.6 96.7 81.7 65.9
1999Q1 − 2004Q4 37.8 114 95.5 79.7Table 9: Average Interest Rate with 4 lags
Span S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 62.4 101 89.5 75
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 42.8 93 89.5 72.5
1999Q1 − 2002Q3 37.4 86.1 77.2 72.2
Table 10: Average Interest Rate with 2 lags
Span S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1 − 2000Q4 67.9 108 87.1 68.2
1999Q1 − 2001Q3 47.3 95.7 88.3 72.1
1999Q1 − 2002Q3 41.1 90.8 78.6 71.4
Table 11: DOLS Results for 1980Q1 − 1999Q1
Speciﬁcation Yi t Yj t ξi j t τi t wj t−4 ¯ Rj t
(A) 1.09 0.37 -0.05
(44.4) (15.2) (-2.4)
(B) 1.07 0.32 -0.046 0.64
(43.6) (13) (-2.3) (-11.4) (1.2)
(C) 0.92 0.35 -0.02 0.49 -0.1
(36.9) (14.8) (-1.05) (12.7) (-11)
t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Table 12: ECM Results for 1980Q1 − 1999Q1
Speciﬁcation ∆Yi t ∆Yj t ∆ξi j t b εi t−1 ∆τi t ∆wj t−4 ∆¯ Rj t
(A) 0.79 0.36 -0.03 -0.14
(14.8) (6.7) (-0.35) (-24.3)
(B) 0.84 0.38 -0.03 -15 0.22
(15.6) (7.2) (-0.36) (-24.4) (1.2)
(C) 0.74 0.4 -0.01 -0.17 0.005 -0.06
(12.9) (7) (-0.16) (-24.8) (0.04) (-2.2)

























































































































































Figure 1: Average real interest rates (over six quarters) were relatively stable
(just below 10% on average) until about 1996, when a noticeable downward
trend began. In four years, real interest rates lost about 600 basis points,
and four years later, after a further 200 basis point decrease, were at their


















































































































































Figure 2: Year-on-year growth of average real interest rates hovered slightly
below zero until about 1996, after which it remained decisively negative, in
the order of −10% or more.A Alternative Covariance Matrices
The main problem in panel data, is that the covariance matrix ΣT+m usually
does not satisfy the general invertibility condition T + 1 ≥ (m × n). In the
text we therefore consider ˜ ΣT+m that is block-diagonal, as we assume cross
sectional independence. The resulting invertibility condition simpliﬁes to
T + 1 ≥ m, which we satisfy. But other assumptions are also possible. We
present here two alternatives. The ﬁrst is trivial, but allows ΣT+m to be
inverted even when T + 1 < m. The second, is a general condition for the
invertibility of ΣT+m, which does not necessarily entail null cross sectional
covariances.
The ﬁrst possibility is to assume, no serial correlation or cross-sectional
correlation. Then any of the following may describe the dataset (of which the








is a diagonal matrix.







σ2 > 0 and where Uτr and Xτr are vectors of dimension (m × n) × 1.
In particular, Uτr includes all individuals over the interval τr, where
τr = [r r+m−1], r ∈ {1     T +1} and T is the potential break point,
as in the text.








∀i = 1     n, where σ2
i > 0, where Xi τr and Ui τr are individual
speciﬁc error vectors of dimension m × 1.
As a result of any of these, the UτrU
′
τr matrices are of full rank, and thus







is also of full rank and invertible. Thus,
the invertibility condition T + 1 ≥ m is no longer relevant.
Secondly, we return to the case when T + 1 ≥ m and present a more
general invertibility condition for symmetric (square) matrices, as is the
case of our covariance matrix ΣT+m, which emphasizes that non-null cross
sectional covariances are possible, although these must be bounded above
by a function of the eigenvalues of the matrix’s diagonal blocks.1
For simplicity, we drop the subscript (T+m) from the variance-covariance
matrix ΣT+m. We also deﬁne Σ0 as an [(m × n) × (m × n)] matrix com-
posed of the (m×m) blocks from the diagonal of Σ (capturing the variances
and autocorrelations for each individual i) and zeros elsewhere. Impor-
tantly, Σ0 has the property of being invertible, since T +1 ≥ m implies that
1The following demonstration was suggested to us by Nicolas Bartholdi.each (m × m) block is of full rank.2 Finally, we deﬁne ∆ ≡ Σ − Σ0 as an
[(m×n)×(m×n)] matrix composed of the (m×m) blocks oﬀ the diagonal
of Σ (capturing the covariances between individuals), and zeros everywhere
on the diagonal blocks. Thus, Σ = Σ0 + ∆.
Then, we recall two important deﬁnitions as well as a property of matrix
norms.
Deﬁnition 1 For an (n × n) matrix A, and an (n × 1) vector v, the
matrix p−norm is deﬁned for a real number 1 6 p 6 ∞, as:
||A||p = sup
v∈Rn v =0




||A   v||p
where the last term represents the case where the p−norm of v is normalized
to 1.
Deﬁnition 2 We deﬁne the spectral or Euclidean norm for symmetric
matrices (with orthogonal eigenvectors) as:
||A||2 = max|λi| ≡ ¯ λ(A)
where λi are eigenvalues of matrix A. Likewise, we deﬁne λ(A) ≡ min|λi|.
Property 1 λ(A)   ||v||2 6 ||A   v||2 6 ¯ λ(A)   ||v||2  ∀v
Based on the above deﬁnitions and property, we advance a condition
such that the matrix Σ be invertible.
Lemma 1 If ||∆||2 < λ(Σ0)  then Σ is invertible 
Proof
Suppose Σ v = 0, ∀v  = 0. Then Σ0 v+∆ v = 0, implying Σ0 v = −∆ v,
and thus, ||Σ0   v||2 = ||∆   v||2
By property 1, ||∆ v||2 6 ¯ λ(∆) ||v||2. Likewise, λ(Σ0) ||v||2 6 ||Σ0 v||2,
∀v  = 0.
By the inequality advanced in Lemma 1, and recalling deﬁnition 2, the
ﬁrst statement above is strictly less than the second, implying ||∆   v||2 <
||Σ0   v||2.
This is a contradiction! Thus, Σ v  = 0, ∀v  = 0, and so Σ is invertible.￿






and thus of rank 1. But to the extent that the row and column spaces of each subsequent
matrix as r advances from 1 to T+1 are essentially disjoint, then the addition of subsequent
matrices adds one in rank to the resulting matrix.This proof underscores the relevance of the invertibility condition ex-
pressed in Lemma 1, but we can go further to restate the condition in terms
that are easier to implement, since ﬁnding eigenvalues of ∆ is not an easy
task. We express this more applicable condition as a Lemma, which we
prove.
Lemma 2
If all the elements of ∆ are <
λ(Σ0)
m   n
≡ c
then ||∆||2 < m   n   c = λ(Σ0) (1)
and thus Σ is invertible, by Lemma 1.
Proof
Suppose |di j| < c, where di j is the i−th row, j−th column element of
∆. Then, ∆   v = a, where a is an [(m × n) × 1] vector whose element,
aj = (dj 1     dj m×n)   v.




j 1 +     + m2
j m×n  
q
v2
1 +     + v2
m×n <
√
m   n   c2   ||v||2
Thus,











m   n   c2   ||v||2
2 = m   n   c   ||v||2  ∀v
And so ||∆||2 < m   n   c ￿
Note that this implies that the cross-sectional covariances be small, but
not necessarily null. The advantage of the above condition is that it is easily
veriﬁable by eyeballing the cross-sectional covariances of matrix Σ, after
calculating the eigenvalues of Σ0 (this is easily done as it entails calculating
eigenvalues for one block at a time). The only problem with this condition is
that its inverse is not necessarily true. Indeed, both Lemma 1 and 2 express
conditions that are necessary, but not suﬃcient.
Lastly, and less importantly, the condition expressed in Lemma 1 helps
to ﬁnd the inverse of Σ. Indeed, ||∆||2 < λ(Σ0) implies ||Σ−1
0   ∆||2 < 1, by
a second property of matrix norms, stating that ||A   B||p 6 ||A||p   ||B||p,




is a series that converges. Thus, we can write the series as (I + Σ−1
0   ∆)−1,
or Σ−1Σ0, and conclude that Σ−1
0 Σ is invertible. Thus, there exists a matrix
M such that M   Σ−1
0 Σ = I. This implies that M   Σ−1
0 is the inverse of Σ.B From microfoundations to regressions
B.1 Regression model (A)
Anderson (1979) was the ﬁrst to provide a theoretical foundation for gravity-
type equations. We follow its more modern rendition in Anderson and van
Wincoop (2001), summarized with great clarity in Baldwin (2006) as a “de-
mand equation with social pretensions”. Indeed, we start with the basic
CES demand function in country i for diﬀerentiated goods imported from
country j, given by xi j t = (pi j t Pi t)(σ (1−σ))Y R
i t, where xi j t is in volume,
pi j t is the price in country i’s currency of a variety from country j, Pi t is
the aggregate price of all imports (including from itself) in country i, Y R
i t
is the real GDP of country i and σ is the elasticity of substitution between
goods. We then note that the value of trade is obtained from multiplying
xi j t by the good’s price pi j t to obtain vi j t, the value of trade for any sin-
gle variety from country j. To ﬁnd aggregate trade of all varieties, Vi j t,
we simply multiply vi j t by the number of varieties exported from coun-
try j, nj t. Finally, we assume a basic passthrough equation for the price:
pi j t = pjτi j t(1 ei j t), where τi j t is the iceberg trade cost to import goods
into country i, and ei j t is the nominal exchange rate between countries i
and j. Together, these expressions give rise to:
Vi j t = nj t
￿












, as per the usual CES aggregate price index
and where k ∈ K represents a trading partners of the potential K partner
countries.
Then, to solve for nj t, we use the market clearing equation or accounting
identity specifying that Yj t =
P












where we label the denominator Ωj t.
We then plug (3) into (2) to ﬁnd the complicated expression:








Yi tYj t (4)
To simplify, we divide top and bottom of the second fraction by Pi t, as in
Baldwin (2006), and deﬁne pk t (ei k tPi t) as the real interest rate betweencountry k and i, labeled ξi k t. This also has the advantage of simplifying
the denominator of the fraction in parenthesis to one.
Furthermore, we notice that Ωj t remains constant for country j, regard-
less of any trading partner k. Thus, as Baldwin (2006) suggests, we capture
it with a time varying dummy speciﬁc to country j, which we call these ϕj t.
Finally, we associate trade costs with a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀect, αi j,
to account for the variables such as distance, common border, language, or
history, found to enter signiﬁcantly in gravity regressions. We then take
logs of the resulting equation to linearize it, add coeﬃcients in front of each
variable and add an error term. We thereby obtain the following expression
that can be estimated empirically:
Vi j t = αi j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + γ4ϕj t + ǫi t (5)
B.2 Regression model (B)
Deriving a regression equation to test the Nitsch and Berger (2005) argument
involves just an additional step with respect to the above analysis. We
associate political and institutional integration within Europe as a decrease
in trade costs. Thus, we simply split the trade cost term in our gravity
equation into a time independent and a time dependent part. The former
gives rise to the pair-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect term, αi j, already mentioned above.
We label the second τi t, a time varying term capturing the integration of
country i in the European institutional and political process. The resulting
equation is:
Vi j t = αi j + γ1Yi t + γ2Yj t + γ3ξi j t + γ4ϕj t + γ5τi t + ǫi t (6)C Data
Table 1: Data Description
Variable Source Description Comments
Imports (values) IMF DOTS Market prices,
millions of Euro. cif
GDP Eurostat Market prices, All GDP Series are calculated
millions of Euro. and transformed in Euro.
Exchange Rates Datastream National Currency to Euro. Exchange rates are used
to convert some GDP series.
and Imports to Euro.
Prices IFS GDP deﬂator index. Prices are used to create an
& Eurostat inﬂation measure and
real exchange rates.
Interest Rates Eurostat 3M real money market rates. Euro Countries have had the
ECB rates since 1999 Q1.
Wages Datastream Index of hourly earnings in Real wages are created using
manufacturing and Industry. GDP deﬂator based inﬂation.
Integration V. Nitsch Index of institutional, Measures the level of
integration in the EU. liberalisation & institutional integration
in the EU over time.
Notes: (1) All variables are corrected for seasonality with the X12 process in EViews 5.1. (2) For some years, the annual GDP series for Luxembourg
and Ireland and the annual integration series were transformed with EViews 5.1 using quadratically match sum. (3) The German Swedish and
Portuguese GDP series were completed by transforming the respective local currency GDP into Euro GDP series. (4) We obtained the Index of
European Integration series thanks to Volker Nitsch.